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P00: frame around

P01: olicognography

P04: pop. economy




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Principles of Wisdom

Basic Olicognograph: Sustainable Humane Criteria

A. Smith: "cautiousness the most important virtue"

Do not pretend to ignore, be positive, try to care everything

Determinism is keen to say what your goal should be. Even democratic minded social scientists of this sort cannot prevent themselves from implicit positivism. Remember that in this modern era, positivism started social sciences (with A. Comte a French creator of modern sociology). This had its origins in the transition from religiously comprehensiveness with narrow metaphysical interpretations of science and scientific know-how emergence achieved by Newton. After religious wars and schisms (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries), a period of natural law and faith of enlightenment (eighteenth century), compilation era, collected an "Encyclopédie of arts, offices and methods", came the launch of industrial revolution (from eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, started by Great Britain), then universities' revolution (nineteenth century first in Germans speaking countries). Scientific academics dialectically needed to think that human progress could be scientifically rigorously organized and people could imagine that they could control and make perfect management of most things in perfect hierarchies.

Positivism as a scientism was latelly discarded (but scientifically sooner than modern people think); since it turned to many, an ideological reference and most of occidental societies identified themselves with different deterministic traits, so as to stay with the illusions of positivism. Positivism there is some little pieces in olicography since still with the hope that positive assumptions on humane ways to drive things are needed, to shape sustainable development of communities. But olicognographic methodology is first a tool box for coping with social problems, including non-positive ones. Positivists’ traits, as part of reductionism, remain very apparent in today's executive practices, as developed by social sciences, management activities and any kind of scientific communication. Common non olicognographic schemes are minded with exact accuracy, show their systemic drawings everywhere; on many kind of supports. They are imagined to be interpreted always in a unique way, simple reduced situations imposed but always more complicated in practice. For example, just take 2 social researchers with the same background, having studied the same things, dedicated to the same case, and you often have two different versions, variable according to position, turned more or less artificially heterogeneous, mixing concepts in different ways, often fighting with contradictions in levels and implications, except when these experts collude to overcome some other third part (be it the weak or the fat).

In spite of the moderate usefulness of what the economist has to say on this subject ... there is a cry for a cultural anthropologist or even a psychologist when the economist runs into subjective sacred cows, extended families, traditional motivations, levels of achievement, and social morale, all of which can be more important to economic development than many of the traditional economic variables. We still wait for synthesis of economics insights in other social sciences in the area (since Boulding said something like that in 1961). ".. psychologists, Tversky and Kahneman were well aware of psychological approaches to the study of human judgment and decision making. Yet, they had also mastered the formalism of economic theories of decision (like with) "people rely on limited numbers of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Hence, each heuristic – including representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment, though generally useful, comes with characteristic biases that arise in special circumstances.

Practically, among costs to not miss in assessment of effects on humane economics:

  • "Costs of preventive maintenance. To avoid machinery from breaking down too frequently, preventive maintenance is carried out. The most important costs of preventive maintenance is usually not the cost of labor involved in the maintenance process, nor the parts that need to be replaced, but the fact that the machinery is not productive during the maintenance process. Over time, as the machine-park is getting older, preventive maintenance will be carried out more often.
  • Costs of (emergency) repair maintenance. Despite the fact that preventive maintenance is carried out, more frequently as the production process ages, any now or then machine will break down and would have to be fixed again. Again, the fact that the production process is stopped represents the highest costs. In most cases, non-scheduled repair maintenance is more costly than preventive maintenance. Moreover, the older the production process, the higher the breakdown frequency.
  • Costs of updating the production process. The introduction of new production techniques or a different marketing strategy, frequently requires changes or adjustments in the production processes. Such changes are more likely to occur if the production process has been operative for some time, as new production techniques become available and changes in consumers' preferences and demands require an adjustment of the marketing strategy.
  • Cost of replacing part of the production process. In many cases, only part of a production line, rather than the entire production process, is replaced. Nonetheless, this frequently means that the whole production process is stopped. The older the structure of the production process, the larger the possibility that part of the line will have to be replaced, and thus the larger the fraction of time the machinery is not productive.
  • Costs of better alternatives. A clear example of economic maintenance costs is represented by the arrival of better alternative ways of production or organizing the production process, which makes the old production technique more expensive in terms of income foregone. The more alternatives arise, the higher the likelihood that a production process is replaced by a better one."

Global: cannot but care, Network, Local: do properly before define.

"Network structures play a central role in determining outcomes in many important situations. A variety of large social networks have been shown to exhibit certain characteristics. "Small worlds". The first characteristic is that such networks have small diameter and small average path lengths.The second characteristic is that such networks have high clustering coefficients relative to networks generated by an independent random process. they are "mechanical" models, where a particular process of link formation (or reformation) is specified, but there is not much explanation about why networks might form in accordance with such processes.

From the mechanical side it is known that in some situations a few random connections between distant nodes can dramatically decrease network diameter, while from the economic side we learn that in some situations distant nodes greatly benefit (in terms of net utility) from forming links precisely because of the distance, which provides an answer as to why such shortcuts might be formed. The fundamental intuitions that emerge from the economic side are: 1) high clustering results from low costs of attachment to similar (nearby) nodes, and 2) low diameter results from the large benefit of attaching to dissimilar (distant) nodes because of the substantial indirect access they provide to other distant nodes. A conjecture is that a variation of the model that marries a random process to how nodes meet with the economic and strategic concerns analyzed here would begin to account for the degree distribution and could result in features consistent with observables".

When the "humanist difference” can find solutions peacefully, working hard with complements, flexibility of switches, complexity, overtaken by anomic dynamics (social concept of violence individually self-expressed like in suicide or in collective issues like in civilian conflicts). Increasingly, surreptitious mistakes of the triumphant economy are paid by people discovering real political violence behind the gentle manners of the modern world; when not the opponents also poor, warrants that their solutions would be better; quite often their nested alternative options can exist only as parasite of the mainstream. A major problem of our modern societies lies in how to negotiate democratic or fair equality within complex “potential complements,” that is, combined as “complex duals.” Examples of complex duals are: business/households, individual both articulating producer/consumers, vertical social “relationists” (who are practically numerous) and horizontal social “relationists” (who are often really few), informant and informed cooperative people, democracy and authority (selfish individualist), social effectiveness (more often weak then strong) and individual efficiency (strong or weak), ethics (as "fig leaves on indecencies") and economy (of crushing evidence), etc.

Confusion and complexity could be what and how we mentally face, a bit like the psycho-analytic "That". Socially and especially if we consider simple democratic contributions with sophisticated means. Many practical activities can incorporate tools and more capital means than you can imagine: machines, knowledge, etc. Dynamic trends of scientific innovation drive huge changes. Knowledge and options have to be managed in accelerating turbulent flows of inefficient rigorousness. On the borders of the flows (margins of the mainstream), many basic values and dimensions stay out, unsolved, waiting for being revealed by disasters. Negative unsolved dimensions increase the probabilities of violence and conflicts. Positive fundamental values are not better dealt, however often better diffused. Good will is easier to express than to managed. Many natural reductions of global paradigms, contrary to their trends, are converted into adverse effects. Social abstract constructions as peace, development, human rights are hedging on a hyperinflation of speech. But these values require social and cultural grounds, more complex than imagined by speeches providers.

Be Positive in Humane Ways while not Pretending to Know Everything

In humanistic things, it seems that the true common local sense does not mean more than “giving the voice once” to the supposed (but selected) “less provided”: "say something and smile - brother - they are filming us". Global discourses, made by few, have wanted to mean too much to everyone else, be them infinite majorities and public audience. Modest socioeconomic solutions have been downgraded; affecting the relative autonomy needed to solve one’s own problems; where must come first and free, the compromise of one’s own resources. Also, it is to think about the unconvincing practical results of social piloted experienced developments and not-so-small resources; so for the "superb intellectual contributions provided to genuine natives", not treated as protagonistic actors but should be followers of a new determinism.

Whatever the seriousness with which social sciences studies and lessons or "results" have been given, it is to understand why they too often stay useless collections of tautologies, exotic commentaries and are often impossible to use locally or to adapt. Even if the intellectual material provided looks generous, well intentioned and effectively expressing needs, it nevertheless ignores the many difficulties of complex realities and good pathways.

Philosophy and epistemology reached curious status in systems of elementary education. If anyone recognizes the importance of the management of ideas and if we are very impregnated by the logical terms coming from and examined by philosophy, not everyone has in mind that philosophy should be a partner of common sense. Alas, modern (called before post-modern practice of philosophy) when it is not the remembrance of the called so great past thinkers; for most people it stay a manipulation of useless, unfriendly, abstract notions, hardly applied for useful practical purposes in common social life.

Within disciplines, basic principles of philosophy or cognition are contained in any method, but their commonness is often ignored. Many supposed specialists use implicitly common forms of philosophical principles but ignore their generality and limit their applications to isolated procedures. Many professionals are not really concerned by the popularization of general features in a way that could help anyone in their community duties. Social or soft sciences (sociology, anthropology, psychology and so on) have developed definitions and deductions for their sense of being special important science but are not really interested in making tools friendly to profanes. They like in them, followers and dislike unbelievers. To sorts of tools to share; cross disciplines and exchange between partners of different profiles, soft sciences experts prefer to stand with their art and retain their disciples, rather than being helpful to most. Most disciples or followers of one theory of practice stay advocates of their bout of science when not just only one school . Mistakes come partly from the conviction of the perfect utility of their discipline, being fully convinced by the exact, specialized requirements of their specific science, their way to make business or the way its narrowed teaching asked it. Meanwhile, reality makes rude social relations without even caring essence. Despite so many doubts, complexity theorization and “undecidability” of social issues is ignored.

Another important question is why philosophy is poorly concerned by modest practical issues or care of people details. Generally, epistemic courses of methodology start only at advanced levels of training but few will turn philosophic, more for pretending to humanistic concerns but not really efficient at crossing barriers of disciplines. Identification is especially problematic in complex sciences, when you try to think about anything (a basic human characteristic). Human mind traps itself and takes its definitions for truth or impose them on others. This may imply ignoring the steps of identification, the failure to develop enough details or the intent to avoid the review all the possibilities of an operative consensus, even if impossible to reach perfect definitions. With complex issues, perfect definitions are meaningless and constrain economical sense, but it is not a reason for squeezing identification steps, ignore specificity, or fail to respect human actors.

Qualitative identification has a lot in common with the manipulation of vocabulary. Of course, grammarians and lexicographers or just dictionaries have to make more clear the common uses of any terms and definitions but, objectively, everyone systematically creates and changes the sense of terms when using them. Every social group creates its own jargon for its own uses and purpose.

Fundamental criteria, even if words may appear as “superficial tautologies,” could be:

  • Individual social responsibility within community networks,
  • Tolerance and excellence in individual commitments (incorporating social utility),
  • Search all means of sustainable exchanges, under liable rule of approximate parity (whatever the support and individual differences),
  • Respect of comprehensiveness and coherence of human dimensions, density, humane distance, proximity, etc.

Many distant leaders from real field (or those trying to apply what has been conceived far from where they are now, do not realize that their sense of exact determinism is valid more for destruction than for socially building. The knowledge of people who do not belong to the “core club of informal deciders” is downgraded, ignored when they aren’t subjected to mockery. The management of “different” types of knowledge is often the mean for social or anthropological segregation; depending on who decides on rhythms that do not fit the natural complexity of the problem.

This is especially critical with natural environments, often wrongly considered far less optimal than human scientific ones. Nature is naturally scientific and human speculations can both remain a marginal, collateral approximation or catch stronger core mechanisms with huge potential effects and affects. But, in social policy practice, natural environments are conceptually residual, even when these environments cannot tolerate transformations without hazards dangerous to human wealth or health.

Exclusive social domination (vertical social relations) refuses to practice sincere democratic cooperation (horizontal social relations) anywhere democracy requires it, even when this undermines the sustainability of all. Humans need good mixing in types of vertical and horizontal relations. As suggested, parity in exchange should look alike between peers. Considering natural biological differences, an effort toward parity is likely to integrate and find a common platform.

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